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BRIEF

No. 3240.
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OCTOBER TERM, 1918.

F.

L. BYRON AND CHARLES S. AUSTIN,
RESPONDENTS,

vs.
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, A CoRPORATION,
APPELLANT,
AND
JOHN KNUDSON AND GEORGE C. EARL,
DEFENDANTS,
AND
STEPHEN HAYS, IMPLEADED AS AN ADDITIONAL
DEFENDANT, RESPONDENT.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

Hon. George F. Goodwin, Judge.
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

On August 10, 1915, Stephen Hays was the owner
and in possession of the locus in quo, a certain tract
of land comprising about 3.45 acres.
(A. 22, 23, 30,
32, 55, 56.)
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On that date Stephen Hays and his wife "by quit
claim deed conveyed said premises to" one Earl. (A. 23,
30, 32, 56.) The deed from Hays to Earl "conveyed"
the "property and premises (A. 56) in fee" (A. 39),
subject however to the following (A. 23, 24, 30, 32,
39, 56, 57) reservation, to wit:
"Said grantors hereby reserve to themselves,
their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to
all ores in and underneath the surface area hereinbefore described, together with the right to
mine and remove same, provided said mining
operations of said grantors shall not endanger
any building or buildings or improvements now
or hereafter erected on a portion of the surface
area hereinabove described by reason of sinking
or caving of the surface of said area caused by
said mining operations, said portion being described as follows, to wit:
"Beginning at a point which bears N. 22
degrees 30 min. E. 269 feet from the S. W.
corner of the west half of east half of the
N. W. quarter of said Section 26; thence N.
17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 feet; thence S. 72
degrees 30 min. East 100 feet, thence S. 17
degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence N. 72
degrees 30 min. West, 100 feet to beginning.
"Said grantors also reserve the right to use
any wagon road which may be constructed in
the future by said grantees over the 3.45 acres
of ground firstly described herein."
In obtaining and taking said deed, Earl was acting
as the agent of and on behalf of the Utah Copper
Company. (A. 57.)
Thereafter and on the same day, said Earl and his
wife, by quit claim deed, in form identical with that
of said deed from Hays to Earl, conveyed the premises
to the Utah Copper Company, which went into the
possession of the same. (A. 57.)
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The tract embraced in said proviso, was referred to
as the "restricted area," and for convenience will be
so hereinafter referred to.
The Utah Copper Company, after the making of
said conveyances, excavated said rectangular strip or
restricted area for the purpose of erecting buildings
thereon, and removed the material so excavated to
other portions of said premises so conveyed, making
two dumps and supported the same in part by cribbing,
and used a portion of one dump to support a retaining
wall constructed by it. (A. 59.) When said rectangular strip or restricted area had been excavated or
leveled off, the Utah Copper Company, the appellant,
erected thereon a retaining wall and constructed five
substantial houses in a row, three of them being
situate wholly within the boundaries of said rectangular
strip or restricted area, one partly within and partly
without said strip, and one entirely off said strip, and
also, continued said retaining wall on said premises
so conveyed beyond the boundaries of said rectangular
strip or restricted area. (A. 59.)
After said rectangular strip had been excavated and
built upon, as aforesaid, and on January 25, 1916
(A. 24, 25, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 59, 60), said Hays
executed and delivered to respondents Byron and Austin,
an instrument denominated a "mining lease and bond,"
whereby he leased to them as "lessee," for a term of
two years from that date:
"All the following described mine and mining property," more particularly described as:
"A parcel of land between Main Bingham
Canyon and Carr Fork and extending from City
Water Tank to Meyers (or Mayers) hotel. In
mining on said land said lessees shall not endanger any building on said lands or improvements thereon and shall in all respects abide by
and conform to the restrictions upon said mining
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contained in deed recorded on page 327, Book
7-F of Deeds, Records of Salt Lake County."
The deed thereby referred to was said deed from Hays
to Earl.
By said lease the lessees, covenanted "to commence
work at once upon said mine, and work the same in a
good and workmanlike manner" and "to timber said
mine" and to pay a royalty on "the net value of all
ore extracted" from said premises, "after deducting the
cost of transportation" from mine to smelter or sampler.
And it was also provided that the "lessees may use any
and all roads on land."
The lessees began mining operations under said lease.
They attempted to remove ore contained in the material
which had been removed by the Utah Copper Company
from said rectangular strip or restricted area, and
deposited in said dumps, which were supported by said
cribbing erected by appellant. In their operations, the
lessees disturbed said cribbing. Thereupon, appellant,
and its employes, interfered with their work. (A. 60,
61.)
Thereupon said lessees brought this action to enjoin
interference with their surface operations, and to adjudicate the rights of all the parties, said Hays being
impleaded as a defendant.
Since the institution of this action, the Copper Company has erected another substantial house on said
premises without said rectangular strip or restricted
district. (A. 61.)
The court entered a decree (A. 67 to 71) whereby
it was ordered and decreed:
1. That Hays "is the owner of all the ores in and
underneath the surface area" of the entire tract, "together with the right to mine and remove such ores
without supporting the surface in its natural state or
otherwise, except as to" the rectangular strip or restricted area ; and
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2. That the lessees have the "right to mine and remove any and all ores in and underneath the surface
area of all said premises," "including the ores in the
dumps thereon, without supporting the surface or any
part thereof in its natural state or otherwise, except
in respect to" said rectangular strip or restricted area.
Appellant sued out this appeal, and by its motion for
a new trial (A. 79 to 85) and its assignment of errors
(A. 90 to 98) asserts and contends that the decree is
not supported by the pleadings and findings of fact
herein.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SUPREMACY OF THE DEEDS FROM HAYS TO EARL, AND
EARL TO THE UTAH COPPER COMPANY.

The rights of both the Lessees and Appellant are
derived from their common grantor, Hays. The title
of Appellant antedates that of the Lessees, and hence,
it is not and cannot be controverted but that they took
subject to the precedent grant, and any right, title or
privilege conferred thereby on appellant must dominate
any conflicting right or privilege founded upon the lease
to them. This is elementary.

Horner vs. Watson, 79 Pa. St. 242, 21
Am. R. 55;
Coal Co. vs. Brown, 36 Ind. A. 44, 74
N. E. 1027.
POINT II.
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

The Lessees proceed upon the theory and contend
that: (1) they are entitled under their lease to any
and all rights reserved by Hays in his deed to Earl;
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and (2) that under that reservation Hays has the
right to enter, at any and all times and places, upon
the surface of this land, and tear up, excavate and work
the surface thereof, and remove and take away any
"ore" found "in" the surface.
That is also the theory of the impleaded defendant
Hays, as his only complaint is that of a loss of royalties
under the lease. (A. 30, 31.)
As we have already seen, the language of the lease
is materially different from that of the deed. Hence
the questions presented for solution are:
(a) What estate passed to Earl by the deed
from Hays? and
(b) What estate or rights remained in Hays
by virtue of the reservation in the deed? and
(c) What estate or rights reserved to Hays
passed to the Lessees under the lease?
POINT III.
THE ESTATE PASSED BY THE DEED FROM HAYS TO EARL
WAS MORE THAN A MERE SURFACE RIGHT.
IT WAS A
FEE SUBJECT TO THE RESERVATION CONTAINED IN THE
DEED.

Originally the en tire fee was vested in Hays. He
conveyed the ''described tract of land" to Earl. Our
Statute (Sec. 1970, Com. L. 1907) provides that:
"The term 'heirs' or other technical words of
inheritance or succession are not requisite to
transfer a fee in real estate."
and Sec. 1971 provides that:
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intended
to pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it
appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate
was intended."

,.
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And Sec. 1982 prescribes a statutory form of quitclaim deed and provides that such deed
"shall have the effect of conveyance of all right,
title, interest and estate of the grantor in and
to the premises therein described, and all rights,
privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging
at the date of such conveyance."
Hays had a fee simple title. He conveyed to Earl,
not mere "surface rights," but the "described tract of
land." He is presumed to and did convey the fee simple
which he had. Hence, appellant has more than mere
"surface rights." It has the entire fee in the "described
tract of land" to use for any and all purposes it sees
fit, subject to the specific reservation in Hays.

Hendler vs. L. V. Ry., 209 Pa. St. 256, 58
Atl. 486.

Ericson vs. Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604, 16 N. W.
161.
POINT IV.
AS THE ESTATE VESTED IN APPELLANT, THE GRANTEE OF
EARL, WAS THE FEE, APPELLANT HAD AND HAS THE
RIGHT TO BUILD HOUSES OR OTHER STRUCTURES ANYWHERE AND EVERYWHERE ON THE PROPERTY IT SEES
FIT.

Later on, we will discuss the right of appellant to
surface support and freedom from interference for any
structure it may erect upon this land.
There can be no question but that, as the owner of
the fee, appellant had and has the right to erect houses
or other structures on this land, anywhere it sees fit,
at any time it sees fit.
The deed from Hays to Earl does not contain any
building restriction. The court cannot write any such
limitation into the deed. The deed passed the fee. Hence
it passed the right to build anywhere the grantee sees
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fit. The grantee had the same right to build on it
as Hays had before he deeded it. That is the. legal
effect of a conveyance of a fee.
As said by this court in Wright vs. Bailey, 45 Utah
584, at 589:
"It is elementary that the parties to the contract must be deemed to have had in mind the
law in force at the time the contract was entered
into."

Appellant had the same right to build a house after
as before this suit was started. No court has ever
denied appellant the right to build those houses and
structures, and under this fee deed no court ever justly
can or will.
So in the last analysis, the question in this case is
how to harmonize that incident of the fee with the
reservation, and what is the effect of the one upon the
other?
The deed contains no restriction on the number or
limitation on the location of the buildings or other
structures appellant might place on this land. The
legal effect of the deed in this respect in passing the
fee is clear and unambiguous.
POINT V.
RESPONDENTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO WORK ANY SURFACE
MATERIAL FOR ORES. THEIR MINERAL RIGHTS ARE LIMITED TO ORES BENEATH THE SURFACE.
IN ALLOWING
THEM TO CONFISCATE APPELLANT'S DUMPS AND CUT
ITS CRIBBING AND INJURE ITS HOUSES, THE DECREE IS
GROSSLY ERRONEOUS AND UNJUST.

The decree allows respondents to work and tear up
Appellant's dump made to support its retaining walls.
(A. 60, 61, 69.) It gives them the right to cut and
destroy appellant's cribbing. (A. 60, 61, 69, 70.) It
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gives them the right to injure and interfere with appellant's houses and structures located off of the rectangular strip or restricted area. (A. 69, 70.)
This is grossly unjust and erroneous.
The language of the reservations in the deed from
Hays to Earl is as follows:
"Said grantors hereby reserve to themselves,
their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to
all ores in ,and underneath the surface area hereinbefore described, together with the right to
mine and remove same, provided said mining
operations of said grantors shall not endanger
any bu.ilding or buildings or improvements now
or hereafter erected on a portion of the surface
area hereinabove described by reason of sinking
or caving of the surface of said area caused by
said mining operations, said portion being described as follows, to wit:.
"Beginning at a point which bears N. 22
degrees 30 min. E. 269 feet from the S. W.
corner of the west half of east half of the
N. W. quarter of said Section 26; thence N.
17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 feet; thence S. 72
degrees 30 min. east 100 feet, thence S. 17
degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence N. 72
degrees 40 min. west, 100 feet to beginning.
"Said grantors also reserve the right to use
any wagon road which may be constructed in
the future by said grantees over the 3.45 acres of
ground firstly described herein."
Respondents contend that the word "in" there has
the effect of reserving to Hays all ore "in" the surface.
They must and do concede that if the reservation to
Hays is limited to ore "underneath the surface," they
have no right or standing to maintain this action, and
no right to the absurd result the decree effects.
To state their contention in their own language, as
heretofore employed by them, they say that:
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"It was any ore that might be in this surface
that was reserved in the grantor; also any that
was underneath the surface. It might be little,
it might be a great deal, or it might be none
whatever, but whatever there was was reserved
to the grantors, together with the right to mine
and remove the same, and there was no limitation
in the way that it should be mined whether by
open quarrying, or in any other way."

And so, to use their own language again, they contend
that Hays
"could go upon this ground, sink a shaft, or
take any other means "that were necessary to remove the ore," etc., including surface steam
shovels, blasting, etc."
Respondents' whole contention revolves around the
meaning of the work "in" standing alone and by itself.
Let us see the result or consequence of the doctrine
contended for by them. Appellant bought not merely
"surface rights" but the land itself and the fee thereto.
It paid good money for it. Yet, on their theory appellant has no rights they are bound to respect outside of
the so-called "restricted area" and very few on it. On
their theory, they can go anywhere on that land and
work and dig and experiment and blast and quarry and
do anything they please regardless of what damage they
do to buildings or other improvements thereon, and
regardless of the effect of their doings as increasing the cost of future improvements thereon.
On
their theory, although Hays conveyed a fee title to
apellant, they recognize, in their own language, "no
limitation" on what they shall do on said land or how
they shall do it. On their theory, there is on all this
land, outside the restricted area, no surface or surface
rights belonging to appellant which plaintiffs would
be obligated to consider in their operations. If the
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word "in" has the meaning which plaintiffs contend
it has in this reservation in this conveyance, then appellant paid its good money for property which, on
their theory, could be of no benefit to apellant should
they at any time desire to enter upon the premises
and disturb the surface thereof in exploring for and
removing what they might consider to be ore. In
short, Hays did not part with the soil he was paid for
and which it was the object of the conveyance to obtain. In short, the reservation has nullified the grant
itself. The integrity of Appellant's estate is destroyed
to create or preserve the reservation. Thus the reservation not only derogates from, but annihilates the
grant itself. So, in buying the land, appellant did a
vain and useless thing. The grant is to be rendered
nug.atory by the reservation. Such a result is unreasonable and intolerable, and as said in Wetmore vs. Fiske,
15 R. I. 354, 5 Atl. 375, at p. 377:
"The possibility of such a result affords a
strong presumption that it would not have been
intended by the parties."
Such a result cannot be sound. In a court of justice,
it must be swept away with the scorn it deserves. In
the language of Judge Caldwell, in Butler vs. McGarrisk
(C. C. A. 8 Cir.), 114 Fed. 300, at 302, it is unreasonable to suppose Earl bought land he could not use, and
"He was guilty of no such absurdity. No court
would place such a construction on the deed
unless its language compelled it. The plain language of the deed refutes such a construction."
A reservation which is repugnant to the grant or
renders it inoperative, is void.
13 Cyc. 675.
Brewster Conveyancing, Sec. 126.
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The court will avoid a construction which entails an
unreasonable or oppressive result.

McKay vs. Barnett, 21 Utah 239.
Caine vs. Hagenbarth, 37 Utah 69.
and:
"The court will endeavor to give the contract a
rational and just construction."
Caine vs. Hagenbarth, 37 Utah 69, at 81.
and:
"Courts will incline towards giVmg language a
reasonable construction and will avoid, if possible, an absurdity if the language is susceptible
of some other meaning."

Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, at 167.
If respondents have the rights they contend for and
which this decree gives them, what rights has appellant?
Absolutely none. Its fee is a fiction, a worthless "scrap
of paper," not a realty.
Appellant contends that the word "in" as there used,
simply means within the exterior boundaries of the tract
conveyed, and that under the reservation Hays could
only mine for ores underneath the surface.
Which of these contentions is correct? Let us test
them by the well-settled rules of construction. Let
us see which construction gives effect to the obvious
intention of the parties to the deed as gathered, not
from any one isolated word, but from the context of the
entire instrument. Let us see which construction better
and consistently preserves the integrity of each estate
created by the severance consequent upon the reservation.
If it was the intention of the parties that Hays should
reserve any such rights "in" the surface, why was it
necessary for him to make a specific reservation of
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"the right to u.se any wagon road" on the land? On
Respondents theory, they could use such road anyway,
or, if they saw fit, could destroy it in their disturbance
of the surface. By ·this additional reservation, Hays
in express terms enumerated the surface privilege he
was to enjoy. It shows that he intended to convey, as
he did convey, the entire surface and surface rights
to Earl as an incident of the fee which passed under
his deed.
Dignan vs. Coal Co., 222 Pa. St. 390, 71
Atl. 845.
It cannot be assumed that he was uselessly and unnecessarily making a specific reservation of one specific
surface privilege, if he already had it by virtue of the
precedent provisions of the deed. If he could "run
amuck" all over the place and disturb the surface or do
with it as he pleased, he was wasting words when he
wrote the wagon road reservation.
Hays conveyed the land itself to appellant in fee.
That embraced and included the surface thereof and
all surface rights incident to such fee. While he
reserved the right to mine, he did not expressly reserve,
or attempt to reserve, the right to disturb the surface
by his "mining operations." We shall hereafter come
to the question of appellant's right of subjacent support. Whether such right is vested in appellant or not,
certainly this deed never contemplated that Hays should
disturb the surface otherwise than by "sinking or
caving" it in the course of his "mining operations."
As is said in Collins vs. Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115
N. W. 497, at 499:

"In other words, having sold the surface without expressly or by necessary implication reserving the right to destroy the whole or a part
thereof, why should the courts interfere and
create for him an implied right to destroy such
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estate, founded only on his most general reservation? It is a general rule that the grantor
may not do anything to injure the estate granted,
and we see no reason for grafting onto a conveyance or contract of this nature an exception
thereto."
The word "in" relates to the word "area." The
word "area" is (Johnston's English Dictionary) defined
as

"the surface contained between any lines or boundaries."
This very definition of an "area" demonstrates that
this word "in" simply means "within the exterior lines
or boundaries" of the described tract conveyed. The
word "surface" does not relate to the word "area." Such
a construction, gramatically at least, is nonsense. The
"area" is the "surface." There can be no question but
that this clause should be construed as reading "ores
in the area hereinbefore described and underneath the
surface." Such a construction avoids nonsense in the
use of language. It avoids the redundancy in the word
"surface" involved in plaintiffs' contention. And
"No word in a contract is to be treated as a
redundancy, if any meaning reasonable and consistent with other parts can be given to it."
9 Cyc. 583.

Unless these words are so transposed they are absurd
and clearly repugnant to the rest of the deed. And
"If what was intended clearly appears from an
examination of the entire instrument, * * *
the words may be transposed and read in their
proper places in order to give them effect and
thus carry out the clear intent and purpose even
though badly expressed."

13 Cyc. 607.

!
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But let us consider the context further. Hays reserves "the right to all ores" and in order to get them
reserves "the right to mine and remove the same provided that said mining operations" do not do the damage
specified. These qualifying words attach to the word
"in.. "
Presumptively, the parties used the words "mine"
and "mining oper:ations" in their primary sense. It is
settled that the primary import of those words is the
extraction of ore by underground excavation as distinguished from surface workings.

'I

Costigan Min. Law, pp. 143, 144;
1 Lindley on Mines (3 Ed.), Sec. 88.
So in the recent case of Carroll vs. Bell, 237 Ill. 332,
86 N. E. 593, it is said:
"A mine is an excavation in the earth for the
purpose of obtaining minerals (2 Bouvier's Law
Diet., Rawle's Ed. 413) an excavation, properly
underground for the purpose of taking out some
useful product. (Standard Diet.)"
That the parties had that meaning and that alone in
mind, is evidenced by their provisions respecting the
"sinking or caving of the surface of said area caused
by said mining operations."
The words "mining operations" must be given the
same meaning both times they are used in the one
sentence. Unquestionably, they refer only to underground operations in the last instance, so they must
be construed as referring only to underground operations in the first instance. Obviously, Hays only intended to reserve the "ores" to be extracted by him by
his underground "mining operations," and not ores unearthed by surface disturbances and workings.
A case much in point is Brady vs. Smith, 181 N. Y.
178, 73 N. E. 963. There a deed conveyed a tract of

:I
:I
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land with the following reservation: "Excepting and
reserving therefrom unto the parties of the first part,
their heirs and assigns forever, all mines and minerals
which may be found on the above piece of land, with
the right of entering at any time with workmen and
others to dig and carry the same away." On the land
there was a ledge of limestone covering some 20 acres
which cropped out on the surface. It was held that
the right to quarry and blast such limestone was in
the grantee and not in the grantors under the reservation. The court said, at pages 964 and 965:
"The question presented in the case at bar
is whether the exception and reservation in question is broad enough to include a bed of limestone
and the open quarrying of the same. So far as
we are advised, the question presented is open
in this court. It may be well enough to quote
once more the reservation to be construed: 'Excepting and reserving therefrom unto the parties
of the first part, their heirs and assigns forever, all mines and minerals which may be found
on the above piece of land, with the right of
entering at any time with workmen and others
to dig and carry the same away.'
"The first point to be observed is that the
word 'minerals,' as used in this reservation, is
coupled with 'mines' by the conjunctive--'all
mines and minerals.' This shows that the grantor had in mind the reservation of mines and
their contents, to wit, 'minerals.' This is further
emphasized by the word 'found' -'which may be
found on the above piece of land.' It appears
in the findings that immense boulders and ledges
of limestone crop out on the surface of these
premises, and it would be a strained and unnatural construction to assume that the language commented upon above refers to stone
lying open to the view, and that the same may
be removed by open quarrying and blasting, destructive of the surface, under the reservation
of 'all mines and minerals which may be found.'
We have here qualifying words quite as persua-
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sive and controlling as those that influenced
the court in Armstrong vs. Lake Champlain
Granite Co., supra.
"The reservation of John LaFarge must be
read as referring to minerals in mines found,
with the right to enter at any time with wo.rkmen and others to dig and carry the same away;
that is, dug out of the earth by means of mines
and m1:ning. Darvill vs. Roper, 3 Drewry, 294.
The word 'dig' has a technical meaning, when
the context is considered, and does not apply to
open quarrying and blasting.
"It is true, under scientific definition, the
world of matter is divided into three general subdivisions-animal, vegetable, and mineral. It is
equally true that in the ordinary phraseology of
mankind a 'mineral' is a word limited largely
to metallic substances. It is quite impossible
to harmonize all that has been written on this
subject in the cases and textbooks.
In construing reservations and grants it is necessary,
if possible, to ascertain the intention of the
parties. In many of the English cases, where
acts of Parliament were involved, the decision
went off on the language employed in the various
acts. There are a number of well-considered
cases which involve substantially the question
here presented.
"In Countess of Listowel vs. Gibbings, 9 Ir.
C. L. Repts. 223, under a reservation of 'all
mines and minerals,' it was held that limestone
was not included in the reservation. The learned
judge writing in that case said: 'I do not deny
that, if it appeared clearly to be the intention
of the parties, to be collected from the instrument, that limestone quarries should pass by
the words "mines and minerals," they might
pass; but words are to be understood in their
natural and usual meaning, unless there be a
clear indication that they are in a particular
case intended to have a more or less extended
signification. Usually, "mine" imports a cavern
or subterraneous place, containing metals or
minerals, and not a quarry; and "minerals" mean
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ordinarily metallic fossil bodies, and not limestone.'
"In Brown vs. Chadwick, 7 Ir. C. L. Repts.
101, under a reservation of 'all mines, minerals,
and other royalties whatsoever,' it was held not
to include open limestone quarries. The learned
court said at page 108: "The distinction between
a mine and a quarry appears to me to be this:
A mine is a place where the substratum is excavated, but the surface is unbroken; whereas
in a quarry the surface is opened, and the material, in the present case limestone, is exposed
and raised.'
"In Darvill vs. Roper, 3 Drewry, 294, under
a reservation of 'mines of lead and clay and
other mines and minerals,' it was held that
limestone was not included within the reservation; it was further held that minerals meant
substances of a mineral character, which could
only be worked by means of mines, as distinguished from quarries."
So here the "mining operations" of Hays were to be
"where the substratum is excavated but the surface
is unbroken." By this construction we find a perfect
coincidence between the titles or estates of the two
parties.
Thus construed, every word in the sentence has
an appropriate meaning; otherwise, they are uncertain, confusing and, to some extent, meaningless. This
interpretation is agreeable to the right reserved and
yet works no unreasonable injustice on anyone. This
is a salutary mode of construction. This interpretation
harmonizes all the provisions of the deed and avoids
any repugnancy between the grant and the reservation.
The reservation was designed to create distinct interests, not to create conflicting and lapping interests.
The substratum may legally be severed from the
surface of the land. But the surface is an inseverable
part of the land which passes with the fee. An attempt

l'i
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to segregate the surface from the land itself in contradistinction to the underlying substrata would be
clearly illegal and void. The deed must be given the
construction which will uphold it, rather than one which
would cast doubts upon its validity.
If the appellant did not get the minerals and did
not get the right to use the surface as any owner of
a fee may lawfully use it, then it got nothing and
simply paid its money for a piece of waste paper. That
would be nothing less than a fraud. Such a construction is inadmissible.
9 Cyc. 587.

If Hays had the right to disturb the surface of this
ground by quarrying and blasting, etc., to get the
claimed reserved ore, it is significant that no provision was inserted in the deed with respect to the danger to life and property consequent thereon.
Clearly the "ore" in contemplation of the parties
was the mineral in situ underlying the surface and
to be found beneath the bed rock. The parties clearly
had reference to the "ore" as found in the metalliferous
rock in place distinct from the surface debris, slide
alluvium or wash.
20 A. & E. Encyc. Law (2 Ed.), 694.
Leadville Co. vs. Fitzgerald, 15 Fed. Cas.
8158.

Such was the "ore" toward the
the "mining operations" were to
risk of "sinking" or "caving" the
so-called restricted area.
In Railway Co. vs. Robinson, 15
Herschell says:

obtaining of which
be directed at the
surface without the
App. Cas. 28, Lord

"In such agreements, in the absence of a distinct indication of the contrary intention, it is

,,'I

il

'II
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always to be assumed that the reserved mines are
only to be worked in such manner as is consistent with the surface remaining undisturbed. And
if this be true of minerals lying deep below the
surface, it would obviously be out of the question
to permit it to be disturbed by removing minerals which can be wrought by surface operations."
We respectfully submit that neither Hays nor his
lessees has any power, right or authority to enter upon
the surface of this property conveyed to the Utah
Copper Company and to remove any part or portion
thereof; that neither of them has any title whatever
to any part of the surface material excavated and that
in attempting to remove the same they are naked
trespassers. To so construe the deed of conveyance
from Hays to Earl as to permit the respondents to
enter upon the premises and remove the material which
they seek to remove, would be to render nugatory the
conveyance by Hays to Earl of the premises. This
conveyance was a conveyance not only of the surface
but of everything beneath the surface, reserving to the
grantor the right to mine the minerals underneath
the surface. This reservation by the grantor in no
way clothed him with any power or authority to mine
or remove any minerals which would in any way injure
or affect the surface of the premises conveyed. He
is bound in searching for minerals underneath the
surface and in the removal thereof, to so conduct
his mining operations that the surface of the premises
will not be injured, disturbed or destroyed. Otherwise
the reservation of the right to mine underneath the
surface of the premises would be in derogation of the
grant and inoperative and void. Indeed, in mining any
ores or minerals underneath the surface of the granted
premises the grantor and his assigns or lessees would
be compelled to leave so much of the minerals under-
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neath the surface as would be necessary to prevent
any injury or interference with the surface of the
premises; and by "surface" in this connection is meant
all that part and portion of the premises which would
be disturbed injuriously by mining operations carried
on in such proximity to such superincumbent surface
as to cause a change in the character of the surface
by way of sliding, caving, or otherwise. Surely it cannot be claimed that either Hays or his lessees would
have the right under any circumstances to remove any
part or portion of the surface so as to destroy it or
to affect it in any way; and the mere fact that the
defendant Utah Copper Company, in excavating for
foundation, should remove surface material, even though
mineral in character, and place the same upon the
premises owned by it, would not vest title to such
material in either Hays or his lessees or assigns. It
will not, we take it, be seriously contended that either
Hays or his lessees would have the right to enter
upon the so-called restricted area and remove the
material therefrom so as to change the surface or interfere with the surface in any way, and if they would
not have that right and would have no title to any
such material, it surely cannot be logically contended
that when the Utah Copper Company, in excavating as
aforesaid, saw fit to remove loose material and place
it upon its own property, thereby the title to such
loose material so removed became vested in either
Hays or his lessees and clothed them with any power
to remove the same from the premises of the Utah
Copper Company.
Respondents had no right to interfere with any
improvements of appellant by their surface operations.
In this respect there is no difference between the buildings on and those off of the rectangular strip or restricted area.
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Respondents, recognizing that no court of conscience
and justice is going to destroy the grant to Earl and
appellant, seek to open a door for splitting the difference by conceding that they have no such right as they
claim with respect to the restricted area and then
claiming that there is a difference between it and the
rest of the tract conveyed to Earl.
And unfortunately they enticed the lower court into
making such a differentiation.
It may be that as respects the obligation of subjacent support for the superadded weight of artificial
structures, there is a difference between the restricted
area and the rest of the land. We will come to this
later. But as respects the question of surface operations and the destruction of the surface, and surface
interference with structures, there is no difference.
If they have a right to remove or destroy or injure
by blasting a house off the restricted area, or to cut
the cribbing, why have they not the same right to injure an improvement on the restricted area. In this
aspect of their claim all of the improvements stand
on the same footing.

The deed reserves the "ores in and underneath the
surface area hereinbefore described," that is, the entire
tract of land both on and off the restricted area. So
if their contention is correct, then logically they have
just as much right to remove material from the restricted area and injure improvements thereon as they
have on any other part of the entire tract "hereinbefore
described."
The proviso restraining the reservation protects the
building on the restricted area against injury only from
the "sinking or caving" of them by underground operation. As respects any other injuries there is no language
making or justifying any differentiation.
Hence, if respondents' theory is carried out to its
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logical result, the whole grant is nullified and the reservation is repugnant to the grant and void.
The material in the dumps came off of the restricted
area. The right to build carried with it the right
to level the ground for that purpose. It is conceded
that respondents had no right to the ore in the restricted area. The decree gives them no such right.
Then how did appellant's leveling the ground and depositing the material elsewhere pass any title to that
material to the respondent? If the decree is correct, a
new way has been invented of evading the statute of
frauds.
We have already slwwn that under its fee title appellant can build anywhere on this tract. Certainly if
appellant has a right to erect buildings on the tract off
of the restricted area, respondents cannot have the
right to destroy or injure them. Such an incompatibility is logically and legally inconceivable.
POINT VI.
THE DECREE DENIES APPELLANT NOT ONLY THE RIGHT
OF SUBJACENT SUPPORT FOR ITS ARTIFICIAL STRUCTURES,
BUILDINGS, ETC., BUT ALSO DENIES APPELLANT THE
RIGHT OF SUBJACENT SUPPORT FOR THE SOIL IN ITS
NATURAL STATE.
IN THIS RESPECT THE DECREE IS
GROSSLY ERRONEOUS.

The decree has this expressed effect. (A. 69, 70.)
This is in line with and as a result of respondent's
contention as to the construction of the word "in."
We submit that in denying appellant the right of
subjacent support for the surface in its natural state
the decree is erroneous.
As said in Wright vs. Bailey, 45 Utah 584, at 589:
"It is elementary that the parties to the contract must be deemed to have had in mind the
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law in force at the time the contract was entered
into."
Again it is said that:
"It is a cardinal rule of construction that that
which is implied is always as much a part of
any writing as that which is expressed."
Cumings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, at 166.
And again:
"If the contract by its conditions and legal
effect invests a party with a right, it is the
same as if the right had been expressly stipulated
in the instrument."
Burt vs. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207-214.

And again:
"The parties are presumed, unless the terms
exclude the presumption, to contract with reference to the existing laws, and consequently the
obligations imposed by such law, whether written or unwritten, are regarded as a part of the
contract."
17 A. & E. Encyc. L. (2nd Ed.), 26.
The law as to subjacent support is so well settled as
to be almost elementary, and fully and completely
sustains appellant's position.
There is no dissent from the general elementary
proposition that prima facie and as a matter of common
right, when the estate in the mineral in situ is severed
from the estate in the surface, the surface is entitled
to subjacent support, and the owner of the minerals
lying underneath the premises granted by him has no
right to disturb or injuriously affect the surface in
any way, and must, in mining the minerals underneath
the surface, leave so much thereof as may be necessary
to afford support and protection to the surface. And
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this right to such support and protection is absolute
and is not dependent upon the degree of care or negligence characterizing the removal of the mineral.

Walsh vs. Fuel Co., 91 Kan. 310, 137 Pac.
941·

Weav~r vs. Coal Co., 216 Pa. St. 195, 65
Atl. 545;

Coal Co. vs. Kearney, 114 Md. 496, 79 Atl.
1013;

Steel Co. vs. Sampson, 158 Ala. 590, 48 So.
493;

Catron vs. Mining Co. (C. C. A. 9 Cir.), 181
Fed. 981;

Coal Co. vs. Bank, 211 Pa. St. 319, 60 Atl.
924·

Hoop;r vs. Coal Co., 95 Ala. 235, 10 So.
652;

Coal Co. vs. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So.
849;

S. S. 0. & G. Ry. vs. Van Ness, 45 Fla. 559,
34 So. 884;

Ames vs. Ames, 160 Ill. 599, 43 N. E. 592;
Lloyd vs. Coal Co., 210 Ill. 460, 71 N. E.
335·

S. M. 'Ry. vs. Mining Co., 138 Mo. Ap. 129,
119

s.

w. 982;

Horner vs. Watson, 79 Pa. St. 242, 21 Am.
R. 55;
Carlin vs. Chappel, 101 Pa. St. 348, 47 Am.
R. 722;

Jones vs. Wagner, 66 Pa. St. 429, 5 Am. R.
385;

Mickle vs. Douglas, 75 Io. 78, 39 N. W. 198;
Yandes vs. Wright, 66 Ind. 319, 32 Am. R.
109;

Lord vs. Iron Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 157, 6 Atl.
812;

Coal Co. vs. Brown, 36 Ind. Ap. 44, 74 N. E.
1027;

Berkey vs. Coal Co., 229 Pa. St. 417, 78 Atl.
1004;

Costigan's Min. Law, pp. 504, 505;
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Lindley on Mines (3 Ed.), Sees. 818, 819,
820, 821;
Williams vs. Jess, 94 Ill. 464, 34 Am. Rep.
242;
Livingston vs. Coal Co., 49 Ia. 369, 31 Am.
Rep. 150;
Ericson vs. Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604, 16 N. W.
161;
Seitz vs. Coal Co., 149 Ill. Ap. 85;
Collins vs. Coal Co., 140 Ia. 114, 115 N. W.
497;
Burgner vs. HumpMey, 41 Oh. St. 340;
Williams vs. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350;
Robertson vs. Coal Co., 172 Pa. St. 566, 33
Atl. 706;
Dignan vs. Coal Co., 222 Pa. St. 390, 71
Atl. 845;
Paul vs. Coal Co., 44 Ind. Ap. 218, 88 N. E.
959;
Williams vs. Hay, 120 Pa. St. 485, 14 Atl.
379.
This proposition is also supported by innumerable
other cases in the exhaustive and able annotation notes
to K. C. N. W. R. R. Co. vs. Schwake, 68 L. R. A. 673677, and Stilly vs. Pittsburg Co., 41 L. R. A. N. S. 236,
which notes we commend to the consideration of the
court. Thus, it is said:
"It is also well settled that, unless the surface
owner has by deed or otherwise estopped himself from claiming the right, he has a clear right
to the support of the surface by the vertically
underlying minerals and other constituent parts
of the land. The right to vertical or subjacent
support for the surface in its natural state prima
facie belongs to every surface owner."

Costigan Min. Law, pp. 504-505.
So again it is said:
"The rule is well settled, when one owning the
whole fee grants the minerals, reserving the sur-
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face to himself, his grantee is entitled only to so
much of the minerals as he can get without
injury to the superincumbent soil (citing cases).
"And it is held, where a land owner sells
the surface, reserving to himself the minerals
with power to get them, he must, if he intends
to get them in a way which will destroy the surface, frame the reservation in such a way as
to show clearly that he intended to have that
power."

Williams vs. Jess, 94 Ill. 464, at 468-34
Am. R. 242.
And again:
"If the owner of the entirety is supposed to
have alienated the surface, reserving the minerals, he cannot be presumed to have reserved
to himself, in derogation of his grant, the power
of removing all the minerals without leaving a
support for the surface."

Humphreys vs. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 731.
"Whenever a person demises a surface prima
facie he is intending to uphold the surface in
order that he may not derogate from his own
grant."

Proud vs. Bates, 34 L. J. Ch. N. S. 406.
In the case of Livingston vs. Moingona Coal Company,
49 Iowa, 369, 31 Am. R. 150, it is held that a reservation to the grantor in a deed of the surface of all minerals and the right to mine the same
"by such means as might be deemed proper without thereby incurring in any event whatever any
liability for injury caused or damage done to
the surface of the land,"
does not give to the grantors any right to remove
surface support.
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In the case of Ericson vs. Michigan Land and Iron Co.,
50 Mich. 604, 16 N. W. Rep., p. 161, the opinion was
written by Judge Campbell and concurred in by Judges
Graves and Cooley. It is said, in the course of the
opinion, in dealing with the question of the reservation of the right to mine minerals underneath the
surface of granted premises, at page 163:
"It seems to be the general, and we think the
better doctrine that a mere reservation of minerals, or such a reservation with the right of
mining, must always respect surface rights of
support, and will not, standing alone, permit
the surface to be destroyed without some additional statutory or contract authority, and that
such statute or contract authority will be construed carefully to prevent the destruction of
surface rights."

See also O'Connor vs. Watson, 79 Penn. State, 242;
and the case of Yandes vs. Wright, 66 Ind. 319 (S. C.),
32 American Reports, 109.
See also Burgner vs. Humphrey, 41 Ohio State Reports, 340, 355-6; and Note to Kansas City N. W. R. Co.
vs. Schwake, 68 L. R. A. 673, 675-6-7.
Mr. Lindley, in his work on mines (3d Ed.), Sections
818, 819, 820 and 821, states the rules deducible from
the authorities and refers in the foot note to a great
multitude of cases, both English and American, which
are cited in support of the text. The learned author
says, in Section 818:
"The owner of the surface of land from which
the title to the minerals has been severed has,
in the absence of a contrary agreement, an
absolute right to have it supported as it was in
its original state, and one mining under it is
answerable for damages arising from failure to
properly support it, or from negligence in con-
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ducting mining operations, or from both of these
causes together."
And again in the same section :
"A grant or reservation of all and 'every part
of the mines and minerals in the land' in the
strongest possible terms would not authorize the
owner of the minerals to excavate without leaving proper support for the surface.
"By reasonable intendment the grantee of
minerals or the grantor of the surface reserving
the minerals could only be entitled to so much
of the mines below as would be consistent with
the proper enjoyment of the surface.
"This rule obtains without reference to the
nature of the strata or the difficulty of substituting artificial for natural supports or the comparative value of the surface and mineral."
Of course, this right of subjacent support may be
waived by contract. But it exists prima facie and
the presumption is that it is not waived or intended
to be waived and the burden is on plaintiffs to show
the waiver. This is well settled as appears from the
authorities heretofore and hereinafter cited and discussed.
It is equally well settled that such a waiver will not
be inferred from doubtful language and to give rise to
such a waiver the language claimed to waive it must
be clear, unequivocal and so plain as not to admit of
any reasorULble doubt. This, likewise, is well settled, as
appears from the authorities heretofore and hereinafter
discussed.
Respondents contend that the word "in" constitutes
a waiver of the right of subjacent support, and base
their contention on the case of Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal
Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. A. N. S. 1115.
In that case plaintiff owned the fee to a tract of land
containing 68 acres, inlaid with coal. He did not con-
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vey the fee to the defendant, but he conveyed to the
defendant the coal with the following rights, to wit:
" * * * 'The party of the second part
and his assigns is to have the right of way
through said reservation for a road, air course,
and drain way, necessary or convenient for
the mining and removal of said coal and the coal
under coterminous and neighboring lands, together with the right to enter upon and under
said land, and to mine, excavate, and remove all
of said coal, and remove upon and under said
land the coal from under adjacent, coterminous,
and neighboring lands, and also the right to
enter upon and under the tract of land hereinbefore described, and make all necessary structures, roads, ways, excavations, air shafts, drains,
drain ways, and openings necessary and convenient for the mining and removal of said coal
and the coal from coterminous and neighboring
lands to market.' * * * "
The court held that that particular clause was a
waiver of the right of subjacent support and in its
opinion said (pp. 1118-9) :
"In investigating this subject, the character
of the transaction should be kept in mind. The
plaintiff of his own will sold and conveyed this
coal, with the express privilege of removing all
of it. The plaintiff knew, when he sold the coal,
that its removal was contemplated, and consented thereto in language which admits of no
doubtful meaning. He also knew that, when all
the coal should be removed, the overlying surface
would sink unless supported. He, by clear and
unequivocal language, granted a privilege which
would necessarily injure him."
The court recognized that to constitute a waiver the
language must be express, clear, unequivocal, and
simply held that the particular language met that
requirement.
And the court further said (p. 1121) :

l
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"It is conceded that the grantor might waive
the right to support of the surface, and, where
that is done, there can be no recovery for injuries
caused by the subsidence of the soil. It is insisted by the defendant that the language used
in the deed in controversy is equivalent to a
waiver. It is true that in this deed there is
not only a grant of the coal, but also an express
grant of the right to remove 'all of it.' It may be
that this grant of the right of removal adds
nothing to the legal effect of the deed, except to
make the general grant more emphatic. Taking
the entire granting clause of the deed together,
there can be no doubt as to the intention of the
parties. I rest the case on the fact that plaintiff by his deed conveyed the coal with the right
to remove all of it. There is no limitation to,
or qualification of, the estate granted, nor is
there anything in the deed to indicate an intention to limit or restrict the right to remove
the coal.''

Two judges concurred in the majority opinion. Judge
Poffenbarger wrote an exhaustive and able dissenting
opinion. He says :
"I am unable to concur in the view of my
associates in this case, because I do not think
it has been or can be, reached without violating
sound and well-settled principles, and especially
rules governing the interpretation and construction of deeds and contracts. The opinion avowedly disapproves and repudiates vital principles
of the law of subjacent and lateral support, declared by every American court that has eve1·
applied that law to a deed or contract by which
the surface of land has been separated in title
from the underlying coal, as well as the decisions
of the English courts. It expressly condemns,
by name, the decisions of Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, New York, and Pennsylvania, and
those of Ohio, and perhaps other states, without
express reference to them. It demolishes at one
fell blow the entire system of English and American law on the subject. This the opinion fully and
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expressly concedes. An effort is made, however, to
free the case from the operation of the principles
declared by the numerous decisions thus repudiated and disapproved by this court, but
uniformly recognized and rigidly enforced by all
others in the English-speaking world, because of
an alleged variance in the language of this deed
from that of the ordinary deed conveying coal
without the surface. After conveying all the
coal in the tract of land, except about three
acres, the deed further stipulates, among other
things, that 'the party of the second part
(grantee of the coal) and his assigns is to have
the right of way through said reservation for
a road, air course, and tramway necessary or
convenient for the mining and removal of said
coal and the coal under coterminous and neighboring lands, together with the right to enter
upon and under said land, and to mine, excavate,
and remove all of said coal.' Immediately connected with this there is further language to be
noticed later. Conceding, for the purposes of
illustration and argument, that a mere grant
of all the coal would not confer, by implication,
the right to deprive the surface of subjacent
support by removing all the coal, the opinion
asserts that the clause above quoted confers, by
express grant, the right to remove every particle
of the coal, and that the grant of such right of
removal is an express grant of the right to take
away the support of the surface, because the
destruction of the support is the necessary and
inevitable result of such removal from under
the surface, provided no artificial support be
substituted. This is the theory advanced by
counsel for the defendant in error and adopted
by the court as a means of escape from the effect
of the general principles declared by all other
courts in cases involving the interpretation of
deeds, severing minerals from the surface by
grant, or reservation thereof. If it is untenable
and unwarranted by the language of the deed,
this decision is squarely contrary to said principles, and in legal effect, as well as declaration of
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opmwn, denies that they obtain in the law of
this state, although universally approved as
sound in all other jurisdictions. In determining
whether this deed may be so distinguished, for
the reasons aforesaid, it is certainly not improper
to ascertain what reply other courts have made
to the same contention, based upon similar, if not
identical, clauses in deeds of this class. If they
have held such clause, taken in connection with
a previous clause granting the coal, insufficient
to authorize the destruction of support of the
surface and to distinguish the deed from one
granting title to the coal without saying more,
then this decision igno,res and repudiates the
application of rules of construction and interpretation made by courts of the highest credit and
repute, and without showing wherein they have
erred in doing so."
He then reviews ably the decisions from many other
jurisdictions and demonstrates the fallacy of the prevailing opinion. He also says (p. 1139) :

" * * * The court cannot presume that
by retaining the surface there was any intention, on the part of the grantor, to retain it otherwise than in that state in which nature placed
and left it. If, in his hands, it is to become
punctured with craters and holes and riven wUh
fissures, so as to deprive him of the use and
benefit of it for those p1trposes for which, by
nature, it is fitted and designed, he does not
retain the surface in the true arul full sense of
the word. If, having bargained for the surface,
he is to be put off with a broken, ruined, and
useless piece of land, he does not get what he
bargained for. Hence it will not be presumed,
in the absence of words expressly showing it,
that he intended to let the support go from
under his surface, for the very reason that
loss of the support is loss of the surface itself,
and the whole general intent of the contract,
viewed as a whole, is defeated so far as the
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grantor is concerned, and thereby the first great
rule of construction violated."
And he further says (p. 1139) :
"The other construction would defeat the general intention and subject the whole instrument
and the general intention to the domination and
control of the single word 'all,' and without
necessity, as has been clearly shown.
This
would stand aside the great rule requiring effect
to be given to the general intent, which is absolute, for the subsidiary rule, requiring effect to
be given to every word, which is not absolute
except to the extent that some function must
be found for each word. It is not absolute as
to what office it shall perform or the extent to
which it shall perform or the extent to which
it shall be effective, and under it the import and
meaning of mere words are required to be curtailed and limited so as not to conflict with the
general intent expressed."
Again he says (pp. 1143-4) :
"All that has been said thus far in this opinion,
however, has been put aside by the declaration that
this deed is free from ambiguity, in consequence
of which no rules of construction can be invoked or applied. The majority opinion, as well
as the brief for counsel for defendant in error,
asserts and reiterates that the contract is clear
and free from ambiguity. I assert that a contract or deed must be read in the light of the
1·nles of interpretation to ascertain whether it
is ambiguous. The mental process of analysis
must be performed in the reading of the contract in obedience to the rules of construction.
The legal effect of the instrument cannot be
determined from one clause. All must be read
and collectively viewed. No words or clauses will
be limited, or transposed, or otherwise altered,
from the arrangement in which they are found,
or the ordinary sense in which they are used,
unless some conflict is found to exist; but,
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whether there is such conflict must be determined from an analysis of all the parts. 'It
would seem to follow, from the statement just
made as to the object of interpretation, that, if
the language of the instrument is plain and
unambiguous in itself, there is no room for
interpretation or construction; and it is quite
frequently so stated. But, in determining whether
there is such an ambiguity as calls for interpretation, the whole instr~tment is to be considered,
and not an isolated part thereof; this being
merely an application of the rule considered below, that the instrument is to be considered as
a whole.' 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2 Ed., p. 4.
The first great dominant rule of construction is
used first to determine whether there is ambiguity, ana that rule controls all other rules of
construction. The assertion made as to lack of
ambiguity, a mere assumption based upon three
words of this deed, was made in a case lately
pending in the Supreme Court of the United
States, with reference to a contract which that
court had under consideration. But that court,
the highest in the land, and at least the equal
of any other in the world, speaking through
Mr. Justice White, replied as follows: 'The fallacy which underlies the assertion as to want
of all ambiguity in the bond arises, therefore,
from presupposing that, in order to establish
want of ambiguity in a contract, a few words
can be segregated from the entire context, and
that because the words thus set apart are not
intrinsically ambiguous, thwre is no room fo1·
construing the contract itself. In other words,
the confusion of thought consists in failing to
distinguish between the contract as a whole and
some of the words found therein. If the erroneous theory were the rule, then, in every case, it
would be impossible to arrive at the meaning of
a contract, in the event of difference between
the contracting parties, since each would select
particular words, upon which they relied, and
thus frustrate a consideration of the whole agreement. The elementary canon of interpretation
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is not that particular words may be isolatedly
considered, but that the whole contract must
be brought into view and interpreted with reference to the nature of the obligations between the
parties, and the intention which they have manifested in forming them.' O'Brien vs. Miller, 168
U. S. 287, 297, 42 L. Ed. 469, 473, 18 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 140, 144. 'The meaning of the parties to
written instruments must be ascertained by the
tenor of the writing, and not by looking at a part
of it.' Boardman vs. Reed, 6 Pet. 328, 8 L. Ed.,
415. 'When the substantial thing which they
have in view can be gathered from the whole
instrument, it will control mere formal provisions, which are intended only as a means of
attaining the substance.' Chesapeake & 0. Canal
Co. vs. Hill, 15 Wall, 94, 21 L. Ed. 64.
"The keynote of the majority opinion is:
'When a person sells a thing with the right
to remove it, or the right to occupy and use it,
he is conclusively presumed, in the absence of
a contract to the contrary, to have included in
the consideration not only the value of the thing
sold, but compensation for the inconvenience
and injuries which will necessarily result by its
removal or occupation.' The fallacy of this
proposition is that it assumes everything at
issue. It is merely saying in another form and
in different words that the contract is not
ambiguous. It assumes that the question of
the right to remove the coal without leaving
support has been determined.''
We commend this dissenting opinion to the court and
submit that in itself it is a demonstration that the
majority opinion is erroneous.
There are several obvious comments upon and answers
to the Griffin case. In the first place, it is seen
that the language of the conveyance in that case is
different from and much broader than the language
of the conveyance in the case at bar.
In the next place, in that case the owner of the
fee conveyed the coal and kept the surface. In the case
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at bar the owner conveyed the fee and merely reserved
the ore. There is a wide difference in the two cases,
because here we have brought into play another elementary rule of construction not there applicable, to
wit:
"Where the surface owner grants the property,
reserving to himself the minerals, he cannot
operate the mine so as to let down the surface
without specific agreement for such right. The
presumption in favor of the right to surfar,e
support is reinforced in this case by the rule
that a grantor shall not derogate from his own
grant."
68 L. R. A. 675.

This distinction is important. It is recognized and
applied by the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of
Collins vs. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Ia. 114, 115 N. W.
497, where the court repudiates the decision in Griffin
vs. Fairmont Coal Co., and says, at page 499:

" * * * it is opposed to the rule of our
own cases cited herein, and we are not prepared
to overrule them because of the distinction between this case and the Griffin case, a distinction which we think may well be made, and one
that in fact places this case, in principle, in
line with the Griffin case. Here, the owner of
the entire estate sold the surface, reserving to
herself the mineral underlying it, while in the
Griffin case, the owner of the land sold the
mineral reserving the surface. The surface here
was sold for farming purposes, and full consideration was paid therefor. And, in the absence of anything in the conveyance clearly
indicating a different intention, it must be presumed that the grantor intended to convey and
did convey, the entire use and benefit of said
surface, and that a general reservation of the
minerals gave him no right to destroy a part
of the estate he had conveyed and received pay
for. In other words, having sold the surface
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without expressly or by necessary implication
reserving the right to destroy the whole or a
part thereof, why should the courts interfere
and create for him an implied right to destroy
such estate, founded only on his most general
reservation? It is a general rule that the grantor
may not do anything to injure the estate granted,
and we see no reason for grafting on to a conveyance or contract of this nature an exception
thereto. We are therefore of the opinion that,
where the owner of the entire estate sells the
surface, reserving to himself the mineral underneath it in general terms, there is an implied
covenant to so mine as not to materially damage
the surface."
The West Virginia case was decided by a divided
court, and we respectfully submit that the dissenting
opinion of Judge Poffenbarger is a demonstration that
the opinion of the court is erroneous. This case has
not been followed by any other court than the West
Virginia court and the Circuit Court of Appeals of
the United States, in which the District of West Virginia is located. The Court of Appeals, in following
the decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia,
in the case of Kuhn vs. Fairmont Mining Co., 169
Fed. 191, expressly puts its decision upon the ground
that the Supreme Court of West Virginia, having decided the given case as it did, there was thereby established a rule of property and that it would be disastrous for the state court in the same jurisdiction to
hold one way and the Federal court another way. The
Court of Appeals, in its opinion, likewise says that
the decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia
is in direct conflict with the decisions of the English
courts and all other courts of this country. There is
found in 2d L. R. A. an elaborate note to the Griffin
case, in which the w.riter of the note takes occasion
to say that the decision of the Supreme Court of West
Virginia is in direct conflict with the decisions of every
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other court in this country, as well as in conflict with
all the English decisions.
In 41 L. R. A., N. S., at page 236, will be found a
very elaborate note to the case of Stilly vs. PittsburghBuffalo Co., which note is supplementary to the note
found in 2d L. R. A., supra, and where it is again said
that the West Virginia decision is in conflict with the
decisions of all the other state courts, as well as the
English courts, and is not in accordance with either
reason or proper construction of deeds of conveyance
in similar cases.
As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Iowa has
repudiated the Griffin case expressly in Collins vs.
Gleason Coal Co., 140 Ia. 114, 115 N. W. 497.
So, too, in Paul vs. Coal Co., 44 Ind. A. 218, 98 N. E.
959, the court rejects the decision in the Griffin case,
and says of it, at page 961:
"This opinion is contrary to the general rule
of implied right."
In Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. vs. Sampson, 158
Ala. 590, 48 So. 493, the court says, at p. 494 :.
"This matter is elaborately and ably discussed
in the concurring and dissenting opinions in the
case of Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va.
480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115, and
note. While the majority opinion in that case
argues very forcibly in support of the proposition
that, where the owner of the surface has conveyed the minerals and expressed no stipulations
for the support of the surface, the owner of the
mineral may take it all, without regard to the
effect of the surface, yet the dissenting opinion
and the note show that tlvat is against the
weight of authority, and the majority opinion
itself admits that, when there is no conveyance
from the surface owner, he is entitled to have
the surface supported, and the annotator very
properly says that the court 'seems to have
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based its final decision against the existence of
an implied reservation of support upon the
particular language of the instrument by which
the estates were severed.' "
In Walsh vs. Kansas Fuel Co., 91 Kas. 310, 137 Pac.
941, the court holds and says, at pages 942 and 943:
"It is conceded by the apellees, in substance,
that as a matter of common right, when the
estate in minerals in situ is severed from the
estate in the surface, the owner of the latter
estate has the right of subfacent support for
the surface. On the other hand, it is conceded
by appellant that the right to such support may
be waived or conveyed by the owner of the
surface estate to the owner of the mineral
estate.
"Appellees cite Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co.,
59 W. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1115, in which it is said: 'Where a deed conveys the coal under a tract of land, together with
the right to enter upon and under said land
and to mine, excavate, and remove all of it,
there is no implied reservation in such an
instrument that the grantee must leave enough
coal to support the surface in its original position.' Several other authorities are cited by
appellees which in some measure tend to support their contention in the case, but the above
case seems to be the strongest and most closely
analogous to the case at bar. That decision, however, is criticised in an editorwl note, appended,
in which it is claimed that the rule is not correctly stated and numerous authorities are collated. That the right to subjacent support to
the surface will not be deemed to have been
waived, conveyed by, or lost to the owner of the
surface, unless such clearly appears, from the
language used in the conveyance, to have been
the intention of the parties, is sustained by numerous authorities, among which are the following cases (citing authorities)":
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And the court then cites sixteen cases from Pennsylvania, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, Alabama, Indiana and New
York.
In Piedmont and George's Creek Coal Co. vs. Kearney,
114 Md. 496, 79 Atl. 1013, the court says at page 1015:

" * * * The property was conveyed to the
plaintiff in 1897, 'except, however, all coal and
other minerals on or underlying said above granted property to the same extent and in like manner
as excepted in the said deed from Maria Reese
et al to Daniel Ritchey and Stewart Arnold above
described.' In the deed referred to is this reservation: 'The parties of the first part reserve to
themselves, their heirs and assigns, all coal and
other minerals that have been or may hereafter
be found on or in the said lands, together with the
right to mine and remove the said coal or minerals
at such place or places as may appear to them,
the said first parties, their heirs or assigns, most
suitable and convenient by tram road, plane and
dump houses or otherwise,' etc."
The court refused to let the words "on or in the said
lands" dominate the deed and limited them by the words
"or underlying," and held that there was no waiver of
the right of subjacent support. This is a square authority
in our favor. The same word "in" is used. Here, as
there, the whole context must be taken, and the word
"in" must be limited by the words "and underneath."
The court there says, at pages 1015 and 1016:
"The general rule of law is that when the estate
in minerals 'in place,' as they are sometimes
spoken of in their natural bed, is severed from the
estate in the surface, the owner of the latter has
an undoubted right of subjacent support for the
surface, and the owner of the estate in the minerals is entitled to remove only so much of them
as he can take without injury to the surface,
unless otherwise authorized by contract or statute.
There have been some discussions in the books as
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to the reasons upon which the rule was founded,
but we have seen no case in which it has been
unqualifiedly denied. Even in Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W.Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1115, which has gone as far in sustaining the right of the owner of the minerals to
remove all of them as any decision we have found,
the general doctrine is recognized. Without referring to the English cases upon which the
original decisions in this country were based,
the general rule announced above is sustained
by many of the courts of this country; the
cases in Pennsylvania, where so much mining
has been done, being especially numerous.
Amongst others are Williams vs. Gibson, 84 Ala.
228, 4 South, 350, 5 Am. St. Rep. 368; Collinsville Granite Co. vs. Phillips, 123 Ga. 830, 51
S. E. 666; Wilms vs. Jess, 94 Ill. 464, 34 Am.
Rep. 242; Lloyd vs. Catlin Coal Co., 210 Ill. 460,
71 N. E. 335; Yandes vs. Wright, 66 Ind. 319,
32 Am. Rep. 109; Mickle vs. Douglas, 75 Iowa
78, 39 N. W. 198; Erickson vs. Michigan Land &
Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604, 16 N. W. 161; Chicago,
etc., R. Co. vs. Brandau, 81 Mo. App. 1; Marvin
vs. Brewster Iron Min. Co., 55 N. Y. 538, 14
Am. Rep. 322; Burgner vs. Humphrey, 41 Ohio
St. 340; Jones vs. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429, 5 Am.
Rep. 385; Coleman vs. Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81, 21
Am. Rep. 93; Carlin vs. Chappel, 101 Pa. 350,
47 Am. Rep. 722; Williams vs. Hay, 120 Pa. 485,
14 Atl. 379, 6 Am. St. Rep. 719; Pringle vs.
Vesta Coal Co., 172 Pa. 438, 33 Atl. 690; Robertson vs. Youghiogheny River Coal Co., 172 Pa.
566, 33 Atl. 706; Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa.
474, 50 Atl. 255, 55 L. R. A. 410, 86 Am. St.
Rep. 722; Youghiogheny River Coal Co. vs. Allegheny National Bank, 211 Pa. 319, 60 Atl. 924,
69 L. R. A. 637; Miles vs. Penn. Coal Co., 217
Pa. 449, 66 Atl. 764 (annotated in 10 Am. & Eng.
Ann. Cas. 874). A number of the English cases
are cited in the notes to Trinidad Asphalt Co. vs.
A mbard ( 1899), A. C. 594, to be found in 6 Am.
& Eng. Dec. in Eq. 643, and in some of the cases
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referred to above, and we will not make further
reference to them.
"Although the rule has been so generally
adopted, the parties can modify it or avoid
its application by inserting provisions in the
grants or leases which, expressly or by necessary intendment, relieve the owners of the
minerals of the duty to furnish subjacent support, and in many of the cases which have been
before the courts the question has been whether
that was done by the particular provisions, and,
if so, to what extent. We have quoted above
those which must govern in this case. There
are many decisions in which provisions very
similar to these have been held not to be
sufficient to relieve the owners of the minerals
of their duty to support the surface. In Mickle
vs. Douglas, supra, there was a lease with the
right to mine, 'all the coal'; in Burgner vs.
Humphrey, supra, there was a grant of 'all the
mineral, coal, iron ore, limestone, and all other
minerals,' with the right to enter upon the land
and search and explore thereon for said minerals,
coal, etc., 'and when found to exist on said land
to dig, mine, and remove the same therefrom' ;
in Horner vs. Watson, 79 Pa. 242, 21 Am; Rep.
55, the grant was all the coal, with the right to
enter on the lands for the purpose of 'mining,
excavating, and removing said coal'; in Carlin
vs. Chappel, supra, the deed of the surface reserved 'all the coal,' with the right of ingress,
egress and regress, 'for digging, mining, excavating, and conveying away said coal'; in
Weaver vs. Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa.
195, 65 Atl. 545, the grant was for 'all the
merchantable coal in and underlying all that
tract of land' for which the right of surface
support was claimed, excepting five acres under
the buildings and spring, the usual mining
rights, were granted, 'with the right to mine
and carry away all the said coal, and with all
the mining rights and privileges necessary or
convenient to such mining and removal of the
same.' See, also, Dignan vs. Altoona Coal &
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Coke Co., 222 Pa. 390, 71 Atl. 845, 128 Am. St.
Rep. 812, one of the latest on the subject. In
those cases it was held that the right of subjacent support was not released in express terms
or by necessary implication by the words used.
Many others in accord with that position might
be cited, but we will only refer to the note in
Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co., 2 L. R. A. (N. S.),
1115, and the note to Miles vs. Penna. Coal Co.,
10 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 874, where many of
them are collected. The case of Miles vs. Penna.
Coal Co. is an illustration of how much right
can be released, while, on the other hand, that
of Youghiogheny River Coal Co. vs. Hopkins,
198 Pa. 343, 48 Atl. 19, shows how careful
that court is to sustain the right, unless it is
released by express words or necessary implication. The case of Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co.,
supra, is the only one we have found where
langnage similar to that in the reservation in
the deed now before us was held to be a release.
When the doctrine or right of subjacent support is recognized, as it is with practical unanimity by the authorities, it seems to us to be
far better to require those who desire to enter
into stipulations by which the one party to the
transaction is to part with the right which the
law gives him, and the other is to be relieved of a
duty which the law imposed upon him, to use language that will necessarily import or clearly express such intention. It should be either by express words or necessary implication and in our
judgment the language used in this reservation
was not sufficient to relieve the appellant of its
duty to support the surface."
So, in Beaver vs. Berwind-White Coal Company, 216
Pa. St. 195, 65 Atl. 545, the court holds and says, at
pages 546 and 54 7 :
"This is an action in trespass for failure to
provide surface support in the mining of coal.
It was conceded at the trial that the appellee
had been the owner in fee of the premises on
which the damages claimed are alleged to haYc
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been done. He sold and conveyed the coal,
together with mining rights and privileges, to the
appellant company. The grant is for 'all the
merchantable coal in and underlying all that
tract of land' for which the right of surface
support is claimed in this action, 'excepting and
reserving, however, from and out of this conveyance five (5) acres of the 'D' bed of coal
underlying the buildings and spring.' The usual.
mining rights are granted in the deed, among
which are the following:
'With the right to
mine and carry away all the said coal and
with all the mining rights and privileges necessary or convenient to such mining and removal
of the same.' The foregoing are the only covenants of the deed with which we have to do in
defining the rights of the parties to this controversy. It is important to note that the right
of surface support was not expressly waived,
and the only question on this branch of the
case is whether there was anything peculiar in
the grant, either of the coal, or of the mineral
rights, and the reservations therein contained,
to take this case out of the general rule uniformly recognized and followed by our courts,
which provides that the underlying or mineral
estate owes a servitude of sufficient support
to the upper or superincumbent strata. This
rule is settled law in this state and has never
been departed from. Jones vs. Wagner, 66 Pa.
429, 5 Am. Rep. 385; Horner vs. Watson, 79
Pa. 242, 21 Am. Rep. 55; Coleman vs. Chadwick,
80 Pa. 81, 21 Am. Rep. 93; Carlin vs. Chappel,
101 Pa. 348, 47 Am. Rep. 722; Williams vs. Hay,
120 Pa. 485, 14 Atl. 379, 6 Am. St. Rep. 719;
Youghiogheny River Coal Co. vs. Hopkins, 198
Pa. 343, 48 Atl. 19; Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa.
474, 50 Atl. 255, 55 L. R. A. 410, 86 Am. St.
Rep. 722; Youghiogheny River Coal Co. vs.
Allegheny National Bank, 211 Pa. 319, 60 Atl.
924, 69 L. R. A. 637. The contention of the
learned counsel for appellant, that the grant of
'all the merchantable coal' underlying the premises, together with the necessary mining rights
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to mine and remove the same by necessary implication waives the right of surface support
under all that part of the tract except such as
was expressly reserved, cannot prevail in the
light of the above authorities. It is now too
late to discuss the policy of the law or the
wisdom of the rule. The argument is not
strengthened by the suggestion that, inasmuch
as the grantor had conveyed all the merchantable
coal, reserving only five acres of the 'D' seam,
underlying the buildings and spring, he thereby
intended to waive surface support to all that
part of the tract not included in the five-acre
reservation. If the grantor had conveyed all
the coal underlying the entire tract without
any reservation, it must be conceded that the
owner of the superincumbent strata would be
entitled to surface support. The fact that he
cut down the grant, reserving five acres for
which no compensation was paid and no title
conveyed, cannot be construed to mean that appellee is in worse position, in so far as his
right to surface support is involved, than if the
five acres had been included in the grant and
compensation received therefor. It is clear that
appellee did not, by express grant, nor by necessary implication, nor by any covenant contained in the deed of conveyance, waive the
right to surface support."
In Burgner vs. Humphr·ey, 41 Ohio St. 340, the plaintiff executed and delivered a deed to the defendant which
provided that (pp. 341 and 342) :

" * * * the said party of the first part
hereby bargains, sells, transfers, aliens and conveys unto the said parties of the second part, their
heirs and assigns, all the mineral coal, iron ore,
limestone, and all the other minerals, together
with all the rock or petroleum oils and salines
in, under or upon the following described tract or
parcel of land, situate in the township of Norton,
County of Summit, State of Ohio, bounded and
described as follows, to-wit: Being the south part
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of lot 73 in said township bounded south, east and
west by the lines of said lot, and north by a line
parallel to the south line of said lot, and far
enough distant therefrom to contain 110 acres of
land. Being the same land upon which Burgner
now resides. And the said party of the first
part also hereby further gives, grants and conveys
unto the said parties of the second part, their
heirs and assigns, as well as their workmen and
laborers, the right, privilege and license to enter
upon the above described lands at any and all
times hereafter, and search and explore ther·eon
for said mineral coal, iron ore, limestone, clay and
other minerals, oils and salines, or for any of
them, and when found to exist on said lands, to
dig, mine and remove the same therefrom, * * *"
And (p. 343) the instrument further provided that:
"It is also agreed that no mining operations by
the parties of the second part, their heirs or
assigns, shall extend to or be so near the dwelling
house or barn now upon said land as to injure
said buildings."
In holding that the right of support was not waived
the court said, at pages 352 to 354:
"It seems to be well settled, that when one
owning the whole fee, grants the minerals, reserving the surface to himself, his grantee will
be entitled only to so much of the minerals, as he
can get without injury to the superincumbent
soil, unless the language of the instrument clearly
imports, that it was the intention of the grantor
to part with the right of subjacent support.
Humphries vs. Brogden, 1 E. L. & Eq. 241;
Davis vs. Treharne, 6 Law Rep. 460 (H. L. Appeal Cases, 1881) ; Coleman vs. Chad~uick, 80 Pa.
St. 81; Jones vs. Wagner, 66 Id. 429; Harris vs.
Ryding, 5 Mee. & W. 60; Zinc Co. vs. Fmnklinite Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 322, 342; Smart vs. Morton,
5 Ell. & Bl. 30. The owner has a natural right
to the use of his land, in the situation in which
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it was placed by nature, and if the surface of
the land and the minerals beneath belong to
different owners, the owner of the surface is
entitled to have it supported by the underlying
mineral strata, and, an action may be maintained
against the owner of the minerals for the damages sustained by the subsidence. Each owner
must so use his own, as not to injure the property of the other. The subjacent supp01·t should
be such as will preserve the integrity of the surface; but, if the mineral strata are not essential,
to prevent the subsidence of the upper soil-if
the soil above is such as not to require their
support, the underlying minerals may be entirely removed by their owner, without liability
to an action for so doing.
"This obligation to protect the superincumbent
soil, exists whether there is a conveyance of the
surface reserving the minerals, or a grant of
the minerals, without a conveyance of the surface. In either case the presumption arises that
the owner of the minerals is not, by removing
them wholly or in part, to injure the owner of
the soil above. According to the doctrines held
by the courts, as summarized by an approved
text writer, the right which the surface has to
support, is a part of the freehold and not an
easement. It is a right independent of the
nature of the strata, and the mine owner can
only work so far as is consistent with this right,
and is liable if he violates it. The highest care
and skill in the working of the mine, is no defense whatever, if injury results to the surface,
from a removal of the subjacent strata. Woods'
Law of Nuisance, Sec. 197, and cases cited.
"If the grantee or lessee of a mineral estate
desires to be discharged from the servitude of
leaving a sufficient support to the superincumbent estate, he should secure such relief by
plain and explicit language in the contract, or the
contract should contain something from which
the intention to discharge him from his obligation will appear by necessary intendment. In
Davis vs. Treharne, supra, it was said by Lord
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Watson, 'When a proprietor of the surface and
the subjacent strata grants a lease of the whole
or part of his minerals to a tenant, I think it is
an implied term of that contract, that support
shall be given in the course of working to the
surface of the land. If it is not intended that
that right should be reserved, the parties must
make it very clear upon the face of the contract;
in other words, they must express theit· intention so clearly as to enable a court to say that
such intention is plain.' And in the same case,
Lord Blackburn said, 'In common right the
person who owns the surface has a right to
have it properly supported. A court of law has
to look at the documents to see whether the
parties have agreed upon something different
from the common right. But, whether they have
done so or not, is a question turning upon the
construction of the documents.'
"It becomes, therefore, a subject of inquiry
whether the language of the contract between
Burgner and Humphrey et al., when reasonably
construed, clearly authorized the lessees to remove the pillars or supports, though necessary
to prevent a subsidence of the surface, for, it is
established beyond dispute, that the ribs and
pillars were indispensable to the support of the
soil above, as evidenced by the damage resulting
from their removal. There is nothing in the
lease to indicate that Burgner left it optional
with his lessees, whether they would or not,
after finishing their mining operations, leave
the surface of his land in an unfit condition
for agricultural purposes. In construing the
instrument, reference should be had to the uses
to which the property had been applied, and to
its present and intended use. We do not reach
the conclusion that because Burgner, by the
terms of the lease, saw fit to guard his dwelling house and barn from being injured by extending the mining operations too far, he thereby gave a license to the lessees to so conduct
their mining operations as to cause a large portion of his farm to cave in, swag and become
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wholly useless for plowing 01' cultivation, and
that, too, without any recompense for the damage
done, save the royalty on the coal mined and
removed. That intention to dispense with subjacent support should be manifested by clear
and unequivocal language in the deed or lease
is illustrated in the case of Livingston vs.
Moingona Coal Co., 49 Iowa, 369."
The court also says, at page 356:
"The contract of lease under consideration
contains the clause, 'It is also agreed that no
mining operations by the parties of the second
part, their heirs or assigns, shall extend to, or
be so near, the dwelling house or barn now upon
said land as to injure said buildings.' In our
view, this provision exempted the coal under the
buildings from the mining operations authorized
by the lease. While it was not permitted to destroy or sink the surface of any portion of the
farm by failing to leave the necessary supports,
from an abundance of caution, the land underlying the lessor's dwelling house and barn was
to remain entirely intact. It seems clear that
the lessor was especially desirous that his dwelling house and barn should not be subjected to
any of the possible risks of excavation, and he
therefore sought to protect them against all
contingencies by inserting the above clause in
the lease. And the court properly charged the
jury that having no right to mine there, it was
of no consequence to ascertain whether the
lessees did it carelessly and negligently, or
otherwise; 'that they had no right to mine under
those two buildings.' "
The following authorities are to the same effect,
showing there was no waiver in this case:

Dignan vs. Coal Co., 222 Pa. St. 390, 71 Atl.
845;
Robertson vs. Coal Co., 172 Pa. St. 566, 33
Atl. 706;
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Williams vs. Hay, 120 Pa. St. 485, 14 Atl.
379;
Caton vs. Mining Co., 181 Fed. 941 (C. C. A.
9th Cir.) ;
S. S. 0. & G. Ry. vs. Van Ness, 45 Fla. 559,
34 So. 884.
But respondents contend that the provision in the
deed that the "mining operations" of Hays "shall not
endanger any building or buildings or imp1'ovements
now or hereafter erected on the so-called restricted
area by reason of sinking or caving of the surface,
caused by said mining operations" is a waiver of the
right of surface support and protection as to all the
land outside such so-called restricted area.
There is nothing in that contention. What was the
reason for the insertion of that clause? The answer is
apparent. Unde1· the conveyance defendants had a right
of support for the entire surface. Howeve1·, that right
of support and the duty to protect the superincumbent
soil extended only to the soil in its natural state, and
did not embrace any duty to support the superadded
weight of buildings or improvements.

Wilms vs. Jess, 94 Ill. 464, 34 Am. R. 242;
Coal Co. vs. Brown, 36 Ind. A. 44, 74 N. E.
1027;
Steel Co. vs. Sampson, 158 Ala. 590, 48
So. 493;
Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa. St. 474, 50 Atl.
255;
C. & A. Ry. vs. Brandan, 81 Mo. A. 1;
Pullan vs. Stallman, 70 N. J. L. 10, 56 Atl.
116;
Gilmore vs. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199, 23 Am.
R. 312.
Appellant desired additional protection and security
for the integrity of the buildings erected or to be erected
on the so-called "restricted area." Hence, they thus
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contracted for it and got it. In other words, it was
only as to land off the "restricted area" that appellant in erecting buildings thereon took the risk of injury
to the same if sufficient support was left by Hays to
sustain the surface in its natural state without the
superadded weight of the structures.
But even then, the burden would be upon Hays to
show that the surface would not have subsided but
for the superadded weight.
Thus in Coal Co. vs. Brown, 36 Ind. Ap. 44, 74 N. E.
1027, the court holds and says, at p. 1029:
"It is contended by appellant that it was necessary for appellee Brown to show affirmatively
that the subsidence of the surface did not occur
by reason of the weight of the dwelling house
over the place where the collapse occurred. In
this proposition appellant is in error, for it has
been held that the act of a lessee of a coal mine in
removing all support from the superincumbent
soil is prima facie the cause of the subsequent
subsidence thereof, and the burden is on the
lessee to show that it would not have subsided
but for the additional weight of buildings erected
subsequent to the lease. Wilms vs. Jess, 94 Ill.
464, 34 Am. Rep. 242."

The c1·eation of the so-called "restricted area" ~cas an
enlargem.ent of the rights of the appellant secured out
of the abundance of caution, and was a corresponding
additional obligation imposed on Hays. It was a restriction on the 1·eserved 1·ight and not a waiver of the
granted right.
This suggestion of respondents is conclusively answered by the decisions and reasoning in Weaver vs.
Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. St. 195, 65 Atl. 545,
and Burgner vs. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340, from which
cases we have heretofore quoted at length.
In this case the material of which the respondents
claim to be the owners, was loose material, and in order
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for them to remove the same, they necessarily not
only disturbed the surface but absolutely destroyed
and removed the same from off the granted premises.
And in this connection it is a most singular thing that
the very material which they are now seeking to
secure to themselves was taken from the so-called
restricted area, which Hays expressly bound himself
not to disturb. Under the contention of respondents,
they could continue removing the surface and destroying it to indefinite depths so that the purpose for
which the property was sold by Hays and bought by
Earl for the Utah Copper Company, could never be
attained; and thus the so-called reservation of minerals
would destroy the very grant itself. As we have heretofore shown, where the reservation is in der,ogation of
the grant, the reservation itself is nugatory and void.
We submit, therefore, that Hays has no such rights
as plaintiffs here contend for.
But even if Hays has, the lessees have not.
POINT VII.
LESSEES' RIGHTS ARE NOT AS BROAD AS THOSE OF HAYS.
THE LANGUAGE OF THEIR LEASE IS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE RESERVATION IN THE DEED
FROM HAYS TO EARL.

If the lessees are to recover in this action at all, they
must recover on the strength of their own title, not on
the title of Hays. The material, and only material question in this case is what rights the lessees acquired under
their lease from Hays.
The lease demised to them the described "mine and
mining property" and specifically provided that:
"In mining on said land said lessees shall not
endanger any building on said land or improvements thereon and shall in all respects abide by
and conform to the restrictions upon said mining
contained in"
the deed from Hays to Earl.
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And by said lease the plaintiffs, the lessees, covenanted "to commence work at once upon said mine, and
work the same" and "to timber said mine," etc.
The very form of this lease shows that Hays never
intended to reserve any rights except for undergr.ound
rnmmg. It also shows that Hays and his lessees recognized the surface rights of appellant, because before
this lease was executed a building and other improvements had been erected on the land outside of the socalled "restricted area," and accordingly Hays bound
the plaintiffs and they obligated themselves not only
to conform to the restrictions in the reservation as to
the "restricted area," but also-"a.nd" is the word in the
lease-not to endanger any building or improvement
anywhere on "said land." What "said land?" The
entire tract demised, to wit:
"A parcel of land between Main Bingham Canyon and Carr Fork and extending from City
Water Tank to Meyers (or Mayers) Hotel."
The famous words "in" and "surface," etc., are not
included in the granting clauses of this lease.
This change in phraseology is significant. The distinction in the effect, as well as in the terms of the two
instruments, is too clear to admit of controversy.
Whatever rights Hays did or did not have to ore "in"
the "surface," the lessees have none. All that they got
under this lease was a right to carry on unde1·ground
mining operations to extract the ore beneath the surface,
and then only on condition that they preserve the integrity of the surface both on and off the "restricted
area."
This is clear under the authorities hereinbefore discussed, to wit:
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Costigan Mining La.w, pp. 143-144;
III Lindley on Mines, Sec. 88;
Carroll vs. Bell, 237 Ill. 332, 86 N. E. 593;
Brady vs. Smith, 181 N.Y. 178, 73 N. E. 963;
Railway vs. Robinson, 15 App. Cas. 27.
POINT VIII.
EXTRINSIC FACTS AND EXTRANEOUS PAROL EVIDENCE
CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO VARY THE MEANING OF THE
LANGUAGE OF THAT DEED OR LEASE.

On extrinsic parol evidence the court finds that
(A 57, 58):

1. The premises conveyed were known to be valuable
for ores; and that ore of a marketable and commercial
value had been found at places at and immediately
underneath the surface; and that surface as well as
underground methods had theretofore been employed;
that in the vicinity surface methods were generally
employed, as at the mines of the Utah Copper Company;
and that surface methods are the practical and economical ones in reaching ores immediately underneath the
surface; and
2. That at the time of the conveyance it was the
intention d Hays and Earl that the grantee relinquished
and waived a right of subjacent support except as to
the restricted area.
Now let us consider what this extraneous evidence
can possibly have to do with the construction of an
unambiguous instrument.
If the Utah Copper Company, or anyone else, owns
lands in fee, and mines them by blasting and steam
shovels from the surface, is that any justification or
reason for applying that situation where the fee and
the minerals are segregated? Is that any reason for
allowing a reservation to destroy a grant? A custom,

for a fee owner to mine from the surface can have no
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application where there is a severance of tne two
estates, surface and mineral, vested in different parties.
Such a custom would be unreasonable and void, and
would also be void because repugnant to the terms of the
grant itself. See authorities heretofore cited, and also:
3 Wash. Real Prop., (6 Ed.), Sec. 2354.
3 Encyc. Ev., 957.
17 A. & E. Encyc. Law (2 Ed.), 18.
Such a custom cannot be considered in the light of the

words "sinking and caving" employed in that deed.
The actual or secret intention of Hays or Earl, or
both of them, cannot change the deed.
As is said in 8 Ruling Case Law, 1040:
"The object is to ascertain the intention of the
grantor as expressed by the language used, and
not the unexpressed purpose which may at the
time have existed in his mind, the question being

not what the parties m.eant to say, but the
meaning of what they did say."
So also it is said:

"It must not be supposed, however, that an
an attempt is made to ascertain the actual mental
processes of the parties to a particular contract.
The law presumes that the parties understood
the import of their contract and that they had the

intention which its terms manifest." (6 R. C. L.
835.)
And again:
"The object to be attained in construing a contract is to ascertain the meaning and intent of
the parties as expressed in the language used."
(6 R. C. L. 836.)
Again:
"The existing statutes and the settled law of
the land at the time a contract is made become

57
a part of it, and must be read into it."
C. L. 855.)

( 6 R.

Again:
"When words have a general well-defined
signification and cannot be considered as technical or as being peculiar to any business or trade,
they are to be taken in their plain, ordinary and
popular sense, for to give evidence requiring
words to receive an abnormal meaning is to
contradict the writing; and it is settled that the
normal meaning of language in a written instrument can no more be changed by construction
than it can be contradicted directly by an
avowedly inconsistent agreement, on the strength
of the thought of the parties at the time when
the instrument was signed, for if that sort of
evidence was admitted every written document
would be at the mercy of witnesses who might
be called to swear to anything." (21 A. & E.
Encyc. Law (2 Ed.), 1106-1107.)
In 2 A. & E. Encyc. Law (2 Ed.), 304, it is said:
"Extrinsic evidence is received, not for the
purpose of importing into the writing an intention not expressed therein, but simply with the
view of elucidating the meaning of the words
employed; and, in its admission, the line which
separates evidence which aids, the interpretation
of what is in the instrument from direct evidence
of intentions independent of the instrument must
be kept steadily in view, the duty of the court
being to declare the meaning of what is written
in the instrument, not of what was intended to
be written."
In Farmers L. & T. Co. vs. Commercial Bank, 15 Wis.
465, it is well said at page 480:
"There is no doubt but that the intention is the
object to be sought for in construction. And to
get at that, the situation of the parties and the
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nature and object of their transactions may be
looked at. But it must be borne in mind that

it is not the business of construction to look outside .of the instrument to get at the intention of
the parties, and then carry out that intention
whether the instrument contains language sufficient to express it or not; but the sole duty of
construction is to find out what was meant by the
language of the instrument. And this language
must be sufficient, when looked at in the light
of such facts as the court is entitled to consider,
to sustain whatever effect is given to the instrument."
Again it is said:
"But it must be borne in mind that, although
declarations of the parties may in some cases be
received to explain contracts or words of doubtful
meaning, yet no other words can be added to or

substituted for those in writing. The courts are
not at liberty to speculate as to the general intention of the parties, but are charged with the duty

of ascertaining the meaning of the written language. * * * The court cannot give effect

to any intention which is not expressed by the
language of the instrument, when examined in

the light of the facts that are properly before the
court. For still stronger reason, such evidence
cannot be received to contradict the clear settled
meaning of the contract." (Jones Ev., Sec. 454.)
The legal effect of the deed in passing a fee is clear
and unambiguous. The language of the reservation is
clear and unequivocal, and its meaning is settled under
the law. Parol evidence, or extrinsic facts, or extraneous findings, cannot affect the obvious meaning
and legal effect of that deed.

Box Co. vs. Orchard Co., 39 Utah 325.
Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 167.
Burt vs. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, 214, 215.
As said in Burt vs. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, at 215:
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"If the words are clear and unambiguous,
a contra.ry intention may not be derived from the
circumstances."

So the rule is:
"All conversations and parol agreements between the parties prior to the written agreement
are so merged therein that they cannot be given
in evidence for the purpose of changing the contract or showing an intention or understanding
different from that expressed in the written
agreement." (Jones Ev., Sec. 434.)
And:
"Such evidence cannot be received to cont1·adict the clewr settled meaning of the contract."
(Jones Ev., Sec. 454.)
So:

"Extraneous circumstances are not resorted to
for the purpose of controlling the writing and
engrafting a new one on such proof." ( 1 Encyc.
Ev., 832.)
And:
"Parol evidence is not admissible to show that
the actual or secret intent of the parties thereto
was other than is expressed in the writing."
(9 Encyc. Ev., 329.)
Again:
"The rule excluding parol evidence is applicable not only to the terms of the instrument,
but also excludes such evidence where it will
opera.te to contradict or vary the legal effect
thereof. If the instrument as executed by the
parties is clear and unambiguous in its meaning and has a well settled legal construction or
effect, such construction or effect will con-
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trol, and is not subject to contradiction by
parol evidence." (9 Encyc. Ev., 333-334.)
Also:
"Where the language of an instrument is unambiguous, it cannot be varied by parol evidence
of an understanding which is inconsistent therewith." (9 Encyc. Ev., 378-379.)
Parol evidence is not admissible to show
"that the intention of the parties is other than is
expressed in the language used." (9 Encyc. Ev.,
397.)
"Where a deed is complete and unambiguous,
parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict, vary,
alter, enlarge, or restrict its terms, or to vary
the operation and effect of the covenants contained therein." (9 Encyc. Ev., 432-434.)

"Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to change
the meaning of a word having a general welldefined signification." (10 R. C. L., 1074.)
"When the language employed in a contract
has an ordinary meaning, or if the meaning is
plain and unambiguous when read in connection
with other provisions of the contract, extrinsic
evidence as to its meaning is not admissible."
(10 R. C. L., 1063.)
"If every written contract were held subject
to enlargement, or other alteration, according
to the testimony which might be offered on one
side or the other as to previous intention, or
collateral facts, it would obviously be of no use
to reduce a contract to writing, or to attempt to
give it certainty and fixedness in any way." (2
Parsons Contracts (7 Ed.), 679.)

"Where the langWLge of an instrument has a
settled legal meaning, its construction is not
open to evidence." (2 PaTsons Contracts (7 Ed.),
683.)
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"The intention must be ascertained from the
language of thr: deed itself where that is not
ambiguous." (8 R. C. L., 1039.)
"Where a reservation is made, the terms of
the deed must control in ascertaining the intention of the parties." (9 Encyc. Ev., 437, 438.)

"Suppose, again, that the words are intelligible, but capable, upon their face, of two constructions, and parol testimony is admitted to
settle which meaning shall be taken, is it not
clear that it is the testimony admitted which
produces the effect, and not the language of the
instrument?" (Branns vs. Stearns, 1 Ore. 368.)
"If the expressed meaning is plain on the
face of the instrument, it will control." (13
Cyc., 604.)
"Whatever the law implies from a contract
in writing is as much a part of the contract as
that which is therein expressed, and if the contract, with what the law implies, is clear, definite, and complete, it cannot be added to, varied
( 10
or contradicted, by extrinsic evidence."
R. C. L., 1046-1047.)
"In the application of the rule above stated
it must be borne in mind that the law raises
certain implications from the terms used in the
contract, and that whatever the law thus implies is as much a part of the contract as that
which is expressed in terms; and if the contract
as expressed, or as viewed in the light of what
the law thus implies from the language used is
clear, definite and complete, the rule applies
that it cannot be added to, varied or contradicted,
by extrimic evidence in its legal import any
more than in its expressed terms." (21 A. & E.
Encyc. L. (2d Ed.), 1084.)
"The language of a written contract complete
in itself and which when viewed as an entirety
is unambiguous is, while it is in force, the
only legitimate evidence of what the parties
intended and understood by it. In such case the
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intention of the parties is to be gathered from
the words used." (2 Elliott on Contracts, Sec.
1570.)
So the same author, in discussing the subject of
mortgages, says :
"To arrive at this intention the situation of
the parties and the nature and object of their
transaction may be inquired into. But it is not
the business of construction to look outside the
instrument for the intention of the parties, and
then carry out that intention when the instrument contains language sufficient to express
it; the sole duty of construction is to find out
what was meant by the language of the instrument. (5 Elliott on Contracts, Sec. 4639.)
"The term 'Construction' implies an uncertainty as to the meaning of the contract, for
when the meaning is clear and unambiguous
there is nothing to be construed. Moreover,
when the language employed is unequivocal, although the parties may have failed to express
their real intention, the legal effect of the instrument will usually be enforced as written.
When the meaning is plain, another meaning
cannot be added by implication or intendment."
(Elliott on Contracts, Sec. 1506.)
POINT IX.
THE DECREE SHOULD BE REVERSED. APPELLANT SHOULD
BE PROTECTED IN THE PROPER ENJOYMENT OF ITS
FEE.

Respectfully submitted,
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS,
L. F. ADAMSON,
Attorneys for Appellant.

